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Executive Summary
Encryption software and hardware use sophisticated
mathematical algorithms to encipher a message so that only
the intended recipient may read it.  Fearing that criminals
and terrorists will use encryption to evade authorities, the
United States now restricts the export of encryption prod-
ucts with key lengths of more than 56 bits.  The controls
are futile, because strong encryption products are readily
available overseas.  
Foreign-made encryption products are as good as, or
better than, U.S.-made products.  U.S. cryptographers have
no monopoly on the mathematical knowledge and methods used
to create strong encryption.  Powerful encryption symmetric-
key technologies developed in other countries include IDEA
and GOST.  Researchers in New Zealand have developed very
strong public-key encryption systems.  As patents on strong
algorithms of U.S. origin expire, researchers in other coun-
tries will gain additional opportunities to develop strong
encryption technology based on those algorithms. 
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THE MYTH OF SUPERIORITY OF
AMERICAN ENCRYPTION PRODUCTS
by Henry B. Wolfe
Encryption software and hardware use sophisticated
mathemati cal algorithms to encipher a message so that only
the intended recipient may read it.  Encryption is the best
way to keep electronic messages private and secure.  Ini-
tially, the U.S. Department of State regulat ed en cryption
exports as "munitions" under the Interna tional Trade in Arms
Regulations, promulgated under the  Arms Export Control Act
of 1976. 1  Executive Order 13026, issued by President
Clinton in November 1996, moved the responsibility to the
Bureau of Export Administration, an agency of the U.S.
Department of Commerce. 2  Today, U.S. regulation prohibits
the export of many products that incorporate strong
encryption.  One important determinant of the strength of an
encryption system is the length of the key to the cipher,
measured in bits.  Only hardware and software products with
a key size of fewer than 56 bits have been approved for
export under a general license.  The administration has
announced that exports of products offering unlimited bit
length will be approved to subsidiaries of U.S. corporations
worldwide (except for those in the seven "terrorist
nations"), to health and insurance companies, and to on-line
merchants (in 45 countries).  But restrictions remain on
many types of encryption products, especially those that
would be used by noncommercial groups or individuals for
end-to-end encryption of e-mail or other communications.
Licensing requirements and export controls restrict the
strength--and thus the quality--of many types of encryption
products exported from the United States.  Products able to
meet the licensing requirements are routinely reduced in
their overall security effectiveness and do not meet the
requirements of the overseas market.  Export controls are
intended to keep sensitive technology out of the hands of
terror ists and countries hostile to the United States.  For
export controls to succeed, au thorities recognize that the
controlled tech nology must not be avail able from sources
outside the United States. 3 
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People living outside the United States find it amusing
and perplexing that U.S. law regulates the dis tribution of
strong encryption.  But anyone outside the United States can
easily obtain strong encryption.  The source code for most
of the popular strong encryption algorithms is available for
downloading at no cost.  Sites that provide the code, scat-
tered around the world, are not subject to U.S. law. 4  Thus,
export controls have little or no relevance outside the
United States.  At best, export controls are futile.
Supporters of export controls  argue that America is the
only source of high-quality strong encryption, be cause
encryption algorithms developed elsewhere are infe rior in
relative security to those originating in the United
States. 5  A recent Commerce Department report states, "Our
information indicates that, on the whole, American encryp-
tion is superior." 6  The report refers to a classified
Commerce Department survey of 28 products released in 1994; 7
the analysis of non-U.S. cryptographic systems is inked out
in publicly available copies, making it difficult to rebut.
 But the statement is hotly con tested and, obvi ously,
subject to independent analysis. 8  This paper shows that the
theory of the inferiority of non-U.S. crypto defies common
sense and ignores a number of strong encryption systems
developed in other nations. 
A good cryptographer needs an in-depth understanding of
higher level mathematics, some basic analytical tal ent, and
exposure to the fundamentals of cryptographic history and
current techniques.  Anyone with an interest in that body of
knowledge can have access to it.  No geographic attribute
significantly influences the quali ties necessary to be a
cryptographer or gives citizens of one nation any advantage
over those of another. 
This paper shows that cryptog raphic products that
originate outside the United States are not inferior to
those created internally.  The notion that overseas com puter
users will not take the time to modify products to improve
their security or seek out strong encryption from sources
outside the United States is ridiculous.  In addition,
strong encryption technology developed within the United
States or outside of it readily spreads to other countries
in spite of export controls.  Al though some other coun tries
have export controls (for example, New Zealand), many pre-
sent  no obstacle to the export of encryption products devel-
oped there, and the remainder (such as Finland) have in
effect no controls at all. 9
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Symmetric Algorithms Developed outside the United States
Among symmetric systems, in which a single key is used
to both encrypt and decrypt, IDEA (Internation al Data En-
cryption Algorithm) stands out as one of the most secure. 
Developed by Xuejia Lai and James Massey in 1990, the algo-
rithm is patented and the rights are owned by Ascom Systec
AG, a Swiss compa ny, 10  IDEA is freely available in source
code anywhere in the world via the Internet from Ascom-
direct.  If it is to be used in a commercial prod uct, it
must be licensed from Ascom.  Products that use this algo-
rithm are available international ly.
The cryptographic community at large has scrutinized
IDEA and deems it one of the most secure cryptographic
systems of its kind available today. 11  As have those of
most proven algorithms, the details of its workings have
been published and the source code is accessible on many
Internet sites.  According to Bruce Schneier in his book
Applied Cryptography , IDEA is his choice for the most secure
algorithm of its type. 12  The algorithm uses a 128-bit key.
 What that means is that the total number of unique keys
that can be handled by IDEA is 2 128, a truly large number--
340 followed by 36 zeros.  That number of keys is considered
computationally secure.  Let us put that into perspective: a
brute-force attack (one in which every possible key in the
entire key space is tried until the correct one is found)
using a billion processors each testing a billion different
keys every second simulta neously would take 10 13 years to go
through the entire key space for IDEA.
 Another algor ithm of interest is GOST (256-bit key),
originating in Russia.  This symmetric system is thought to
be at least as strong as the DES (American Data Encryption
Standard) and probably much stronger.  The key space of GOST
(2 256) is defined as 115 followed by 75 zeros.  Under certain
conditions, the prescribed key space for GOST can be as
large as 2 610--a number too large to be grasped and certainly
far beyond any brute-force attack.
It is worth mentioning that a brute-force attack is at
this time the only reasonable attack strategy for both IDEA
and GOST.  One researcher thought he had identified a weak-
ness in GOST, but unless the attacker can alter certain
conditions--rarely the case in normal use--the probability
of success "is too low to make the attack practical." 13
Other symmetric-key strong cryptographic products based
in part on U.S. technology have been developed in other
countries.  One example is TeamWARE Crypto, which is pro-
Page 5
duced in Finland. 14  This product offers a number of algo-
rithms as options, including Blowfish (448-bit keys), DESX Ô
(120-bit keys), D3DES (112-bit keys), and IDEA (128-bit keys
available under separate license from Ascom).  All of those
algorithms are believed to provide strong encryp tion.  With
a simple and user-friendly inter face, TeamWARE Crypto will
undoubtedly proliferate global ly.  It is compat ible with the
most common operating systems cur rently avail able, including
Windows 95 and NT.
Another example of a strong encryption product created
and available outside the United States is F-Secure Desk top,
which runs under Windows 95 or NT.  It was created by Data
Fellows of Espoo, Finland, and is distributed in more than
50 countries.  F-Secure offers the option of choosing either
of two symmetric block ciphers: Blowfish or Triple DES.  It
is inexpensive, easy to use, and easily available inside and
outside the United States.
Public-Key Crypto Systems
Asymmetric crypto systems, also known as "public-key"
systems, are called "asymmetric" because one key is used to
encrypt the message, whereas a different key is used to
decrypt it.  Every user creates a key pair that has a spe-
cial mathematical relationship.  One key is published freely
(the public key); the other mathematically related key (the
private key) must be kept private by the owner.  Someone
wishing to communicate securely uses the public key to
encrypt the message, and only the related private key can
decrypt it.  Asymmetric crypto-systems have the advan tage of
not requiring keys to be exchanged before secure communica-
tions.  Converse ly, one of the weaknesses of symmetric
systems is the inabili ty to find a secure channel to commu-
nicate the key.
The RSA (named for Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len
Adleman, its creators) was one of the first public-key
systems.  The RSA algorithm was developed in the United
States and is considered one of the most formidable public-
key systems.  But there are other public-key systems thought
to be equally formidable, such as the ElGamal system. 
The security of publi c-key systems is based on the
difficulty of solving certain complex mathematical prob lems;
the harder the problem, the more secure the key.  RSA's
strenth lies in the difficulty of factoring the product of
large prime numbers, given only the product.  ElGamal's
strength is based on the difficulty of solving the discrete
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logarithm problem--that is, it is easy to raise a number to
an exponent but difficult to find the exponent, given the
result. 15  Other systems are based on other intractable
problems.
The ElGamal system is not patented, which gives devel-
opers located in many countries an opportunity to use it as
a basis for strong new encryption prod ucts. 16  Also, the RSA
patent expires on September 20, 2000, making it a target of
developers around the world. 17      
Indeed, the RSA algorithm is used around the world
every time someone uses Phil Zimmerman's Pretty Good Priva-
cy.  PGP encompasses three different algorithms (including
IDEA, which was not developed in the United States) to
accomplish fast public-key encryption.  The source code for
PGP was placed on the Internet and has proliferated global-
ly.  Many believe PGP is the most commonly used encryption
software in the world.  Even recent versions of PGP are
freely available outside the United States in spite of the
regulations prohibiting their foreign distribution.
Public-key products have also been developed outside of
the United States.  A community of interest in New Zealand
may prove significant in developing new public-key encryp-
tion systems.  Two public-key systems have been developed
there, and both show promise as competitors to RSA. 
The first, called LUC, was developed by Peter Smith of
Auckland. 18  That system uses the difficulty of solving
problems involving Lucas functions, 19 instead of relying on
the difficulty of factoring a product of two large prime
numbers.  Since 1993 LUC has been subjected to the scrutiny
of the cryptographic community, whose members think LUC is
as secure as the RSA system.  Thus far, no successful attack
has been published.  New Zealand's export controls have
proven no obstacle to LUC's being licensed around the world.
William M. Raike of Auckland created the second public-
key system developed in New Zealand, RPK. 20  RPK uses a
patented hard-to-crack feature called a "mixture genera-
tor," 21 a complex combination of several cryptograph ic
subgenerators.  In cryptography, those generators create
keys and provide random noise inputs for the cryptographic
algo rithm to operate on in creating keys.  The secur ity of
RPK's algorithm depends on the difficulty of calculating the
discrete logarithms in finite Galois Fields. 22  Again, the
security of that relatively new algorithm has not yet been
invalidated by any successful attack.  The complexity of the
mathematics involved indicates that RPK is every bit as
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secure as RSA or LUC.  Raike's company, RPK New Zealand
Ltd., has also issued a challenge to the community at large ,
offering $10,000 (U.S.) to anyone who can break the RPK
crypto-system.  As has LUC, the system has been li censed for
worldwide use and is being aggressively marketed interna-
tionally. 23
The foregoing systems and others show that the devel-
opment of strong crypto-systems continues worldwide in
several communities of interest.  The result of any U.S. ban
on strong encryption or constraint on its use would be the
further development of those systems.  Export controls will
not prevent the proliferation and use of cryptographic
systems across international boundaries outside the United
States.
Integration and Quality Issues
In theory, the development of encryption overseas might
be hampered by the fact that more than 80 percent of the
software used overseas is developed in the United States;
perhaps the quality of overseas encryption is limited by
failure to integrate well into U.S.-made soft ware.  But most
strong encryption products will perform quite pleasingly
within the standard environment produced by U.S. software
manufacturers, including within Microsoft Windows and NT. 
A recent examp le of strong encryption incorporated into
a U.S.-produced software product is Netscape.  Net scape is
the most commonly used Internet browser today; it also can
be used to send and receive e-mail.  The "crip pled" version
of Netscape licensed for export can easily be brought to
full strength using an ordinary PC.  On March 31, 1998,
Netscape made its software available in source code form;
the version is known as Mozilla. 24  Because the source code
contained no encryption routines, the export controls did
not apply and the source code quickly found its way outside
the United States. 
Nine Australian software developers and three from the
United Kingdom immediately formed the Mozilla Crypto Group
for "fostering the development and integration of full-
strength cryptography for this critical package from Net-
scape." 25  Fifteen hours after Mozilla was released, a Linux
version dubbed Cryptozilla was ready for distribu tion. 
Shortly thereafter, versions for other platforms, including
Windows 95 and NT, emerged.  Now, anyone in the world can
download a version of Netscape containing strong 128-bit
encryption routines from the Internet. 26  That is an excel
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lent example of how export controls can be super seded. 
Export controls do not and cannot work.
Indeed, in sofar as export controls prevent U.S. soft-
ware manufacturers from building encryption into all their
word processing and network software, the greatest impact of
export controls is to limit the quality of U.S.-made encryp-
tion.  U.S. manufacturers may export only products of inade-
quate bit length for most applications, and they are dis-
couraged from offering integrated products.  The U.S. Data
Encryption Standard, offering a 56-bit key, has been public-
ly defeated by three separate groups.  In the first in-
stance, it took 78,000 computers working in concert for 96
days.  In the second instance, it took 50,000 computers
working in concert for 39 days.  On July 17, 1998, the DES
was solved for a third time.  That time, the code cracker
found the key using one custom-built computer in only 56
hours  (at a total cost of $210,000). The DES can no longer
be considered adequate cryptographic protection.  The plans
and technical specifications for the custom-built machine
are available around the world.  I live in New Zealand, and
I have a copy of those plans. 27
Many software applications that originate in the United
States are exported to countries worldwide.  A number of the
products, includ ing Netscape and the Micro soft  Office suite,
have built-in cryptography.  Both Word and Excel (two appli-
cations included in the suite) have a cryptographic feature,
which in export versions must be reduced to 40-bit encryp-
tion (outside the United States, that condition goes by the
politically incorrect term " crippledware").  Most computer
users know about the feature and its limitations.  Those who
want cryptography that has not been deliberately diminished
in its capacity to protect their information have the prod-
ucts described in this paper and many others to choose from.
 Encryption features built into general applications like
word proces sors are convenient.  But special-purpose encryp-
tion software is just as strong and is designed to overcome
any inconvenience built into the U.S.-produced general
applica tions.  The c ryptographic genie cannot be put back
into the bottle.
Conclusion
The arguments for limiting the proliferation and use of
strong encryption are mainly emotional.  Supporters of
export controls insist that strong encryption should be
freed for export only with built-in key escrow features. 
The adminis tration has now announced that all key escrow
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products will be exportable after one-time review.  In a key
escrow system, a third party must be given the secret key
that decrypts the encrypted messages.  That third party may
then give the key to law enforcement agents, unbeknown to
either the sender or receiver, to stop the "bad guys" from
doing or planning anything harmful.  To gain public accep-
tance of that notion, supporters portray key escrow and
export controls as essential to save us from terror ists,
drug dealers, child pornographers, and others.  
However, those who have argued for key escrow in what-
ever incarnation have failed to show any proof, scien tific
or otherwise, that "bad guys" are too stupid to seek out
strong encryption without key escrow features.  In reality,
"bad guys" are unlikely to use anything less than the stron-
gest encryption for their communication and data storage. 
Conspir ators involved in planning capital crimes will  not be
worried about violating anti-cryptography laws.  To conceal
their use of illegal cryptography, they could super-encrypt
their messages: first encrypt a message with a strong algo-
rithm, and then encrypt that result using the key escrow
version. 28
Even the National Security Agency admits that key
recovery schemes will not solve law enforcement's prob lems
with encrypted information.  An NSA report on key recovery
issued in February 1998 lists at least 18 examples of how
such a system could be thwarted. 29  The lone player insist-
ing on key escrow is the Federal Bureau of Investiga tion. 
The FBI has not yet shown any material basis for imposing
restrictions on cryptographic use by private citi zens, nor
has it proven that any restrictions imposed would in fact be
effective.
Where does that leave us?  The result is export control
laws that demand an intolerable sacrifice of freedom and
privacy for a token, ineffectual commitment to security. 
Owing to widespread availability of cryptography abroad,
criminals and terrorists are unaffected by the rules.  But
innovative cryptographers in the United States--and many who
would use their products around the world--remain bound in
red tape.  The First Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution guarantees the right to communi cate without govern-
ment interference: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohib iting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the government for a redress of grievances." 
Encryption software and hardware simply enable one to speak
in a language unknown to the government.  The Constitution
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gives the government no power to demand that we provide a
transla tion.  Speech in the dialect of IDEA should be free
around the world.  And it will be.  Export controls hurt the
United States far more than they help. 
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